I. INTRODUCTION
Within the scope ofRule 26 ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it has been difficult to determine a role for the treating physician as a witness. The "[amended federal] rules of discovery and evidence have camouflaged the treating physician. The time has come to explore the forest of precedent [Vol. 9:1 in search of that chameleon." 1 Whether a physician should be treated as a fact witness or an expert witness in federal courts has been a matter of debate for some time because of their dual roles as both types of witnesses. 2 As fact witnesses, treating physicians testify as ''first-hand participants in the diagnosis and treatment of the plaintiff," yet "diagnosis and treatment are almost certainly informed by the physician's specialized training and knowledge." 3 In other words, treating doctors are first-hand observers of what has occurred to their patients, but may also be seen as scientific experts when speaking to complex medical issues. 4 Before the 1993 amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a), a doctor needed to be disclosed as an expert only when he was testifying as to causation or speaking beyond the scope of his or her treatment of a patient. s Whether a witness was an expert depended on the "not status of the witness, but rather on the substance of the testimony.'.6 In addition, experts were not required to produce an expert report. 7 However, the 1993 amendments to Rule 26 and subsequent case law changed this process by requiring those who are retained in anticipation of litigation to provide an expert report. 8 Rule 26 was amended again in December 2010 to require a summary report from even those witnesses who are not retained in anticipation of litigation. 9 As a result of these developments, the time. is ripe to definitively decide how treating physicians should be categorized in the Seventh Circuit. This note will generally discuss whether a physician should be treated as a 3. Id 4. The Federal Rules of Evidence draw a line between expert testimony and fact testimony. FED. R. EVID. 701 qualifies lay witness fact testimony as, "limited to those opinions or inferenCes which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical. or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702." Alternatively, FED. R. EVID. 702 describes testimony by experts as when "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue," and such a witness is "qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." 5. FED. R. CN. P. 26 advisory committee's note (1970) . See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791-92 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("Experts are ordinarily indispensible to identifY and elucidate for the ~der the risks of therapy and the co~equences ofleaving existing maladies untreated. They are normally needed on issues as to the cause of any inju~ ry or disability suffered by the patient and, where privileges are asserted, as to the existence of any emergency claimed and the nature and seriousness of any impact upon the patient from risk~disclosure.").
6. Patel v. Gayes, 984 F.2d 214, 218 (7th Cir. 1993 fact witness or an expert witness. Part II will examine the historical background of this issue, including (a) an examination of the case law prior to 1993, (b) the 1993 Rule 26 amendments, (c) a survey of methods taken in response to the 1993 Rule 26 amendments, (d) a survey of cases in the Seventh Circuit, and (e) a consideration of the problems lingering from. these strategies. Part III will discuss the new addition to Rule 26 and its potential ramifications. Part IV will propose a framework for where to place treating physicians within the context of the amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure26.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to improve this system, it is important to first understand the history behind it. Before the December 2010 Rule 26 amendments, there were two other important amendments that affected treating physicians under Rule 26, 10 occurring first in 1970~ 11 and then in 1993. 12 The expert witness status of treating physicians has drastically changed with each amendment. 13 Although both amendments set standards for disclosures of experts, each essentially left federal courts to decide on their own how to categorize a plaintiff's treating physician, creating problems that have lingered to present day.
A. Case Law Prior to the 1993 Rule 26 Amendments
Until 1993, Rule 26 did not affect the expert whose information was not obtained in anticipation of litigation "because he was an actor or viewer with respect to transactions or occurrences that are part of the subject matter of the lawsuit." 14 These witnesses were instead treated as ordinary witnesses.15 Furthermore, experts did not need to produce reports before the 1993 amendments to Rule 26. 16 Regardless of whether they were obtained in anticipation of litigation, parties were merely given equal opportunity to interview opposing experts through interrogatories. 17 In these interrogatories, experts could be asked to "state the subject matter on which the expert [Vol. 9:1 is expected to testify, and to state the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion." 18 Before 1993, the Seventh Circuit determined whether a treating physician needed to be disclosed as an expert before trial under Rule 26 by "focus[ing] not on the status of the witness, but rather on the substance of the testimony." 19 Accordingly, a doctor who was "acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial" would be more likely considered an expert.2° Doctors gave '"classic' expert testimony'' by opining as to "the general medical standard of care within the community," since " [a] witness would formulate such an opinion only when preparing for litigation.'.zt
B. The 1993 Amendments to Rule 26(a)
The 1993 Rule 26(a) amendments were considered by some to be controversial and the "most sweeping changes since the rules first were adopted in 1938." 22 Newly amended Rule 26(a)(2)(B) provided, Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, this [expert] disclosure must be accompanied by a written report-prepared and signed by the witnessif the witness is one retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or one whose duties as the party's employee regularly involve giving expert testimony. 23 These changes were quite a departure from the past requirements, as they greatly enhanced the disclosure requirements for retained experts by requiring an "extremely detailed report'' as opposed to "the rather general 18 . ld (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(A) (1970) (repealed 1993) interrogatory authorized by the 1970 provisions.'.2 4 These amendments were generated because under the former rule, "answering interrogatories about the 'substance' of expert testimony was frequently so sketchy and vague that it rarely dispensed with the need to depose the expert and often was even of little help in preparing for a deposition of the witness. " 25 In tandem with the revised Rule 37(c)(l), the Rule 26 amendments also created incentives for full disclosure, as "a party [would] not ordinarily be permitted to use on direct examination any expert testimony not so disclosed. '.2 6 The formal report requirement included the need for his or her opinions, bases for his or her opinions, and all material "considered" by the expert. 27 This report preparation requirement was particularly significant because before the change, experts were rarely asked to prepare an early report, and when they did prepare such a report, it often "lock[ ed] the expert into opinions and subject[ ed] her to limiting cross-examination. " 28 Yet, the new requirements simultaneously left enormous ambiguity as to when a treating physician was a fact witness and as to when an expert needed to produce a report.
C. Survey of Cases in United States Federal Courts
Without much formal guidance as to those witnesses who were not retained in anticipation of litigation, federal courts had difficulty navigating the 1993 changes to Rule 26. 29 left some clues, however, stating that a treating physician "can be deposed or called to testify at trial without any requirement for a written report.'m Most federal courts do require the disclosure of a treating physician as an expert by a patient. 32 However, failure to disclose does not necessarily lead to the exclusion of that doctor. 33 Moreover, no clear consensus has been reached amongst federal courts on the expert report requirement, resulting in the use of several approaches. 34
Failure to Disclose May Not Preclude Treating Physician from Testifying
For some courts, failure to disclose a treating physician as an expert witness does not necessarily prevent a party from utilizing the physician's factual testimony at trial. 35 Courts following a more narrow approach conclude that those treating physicians whom parties fail to designate as an expert witness "generally may only· testify as to the observations they made regarding the plaintiff during the course of treatment." 36 Federal courts following a broader approach allow a treating physician's fact testimony to encompass ''any testimony based on the physician's care and treatment of the patient," and it is " [o] nly when the treating physician's proposed testimony goes outside of that broadly defined scope [that] disclosure under Rule 26(a) (2)(A) is required.'"' 2 For instance, in distinguishing whether a treating physician testified as a fact witness or an expert witness, the court in Jones v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. concluded that "a physician who testifies on information and opinions developed and drawn during the treatment of the party as a patient is considered to be an ordinary fact witness rather than an expert.'"' 3 Recognizing that "no single bright line test" existed, the court found that it "must look to whether the medical opinions, conclusions and observations being offered by the treating physi.,. cian necessarily played a role in his or her care and treatment of the plaintiff.'.44 Accordingly, the court concluded that it could not give the plaintiff "any advance determination" as to the necessity of expert reports. 45 
After Designation as an Expert, Should a Report Be Produced?
After designating the treating physician as an expert, courts also disagree as to whether an expert report needs to be produced. 46 Some courts require a report only when a treating physician is testifying to causation, prognosis, and future disability. 47 Other courts find that as long as the treating physicians' testimonies are based on personal knowledge, there is no need to produce a report. 48 One additional approach declares that whether a report needs to be provided depends on the extent of the treating physi- [Vol. 9:1 cian's testimony. 49 The issue has even caused splits amongst district courts within the same court ofappeals. 50 a. Expert report required only when testifying to causation, prognosis, and/or future disability Some districts only require an expert report when a treating physician opines as to causation, prognosis, or future disability. 51 For instance, in Upchurch v. Hester, the court found that whether a treating physician must provide an expert report depended upon the "substance of the testimony" as opposed to "the status of the witness." 52 Thus, a treating physician whose testimony "reaches beyond the basic facts learned during the treatment of a patient, and extends to typical opinion testimony," must produce an expert report. 5 3 In United States v. Henderson, the Eleventh Circuit held that "(a] treating physician is not considered an expert witness if he or she testifies about observations based on personal knowledge, including the treatment of the party." 54 However, the role of a treating physician transforms when he begins to answer hypothetically, as the essential difference between expert and lay witnesses is that an expert may be asked hypothetical questions. 55 In Bengston v. Bazemore, the court found that Rule 26 centered "not on the status of the witness, but rather the substance of the testimony." 56 A treating physician testifying to his or her opinions concerning "the care and treatment of a patient" does not necessitate an expert report. 57 Thus, no report needs to be produced when a treating physician testifies to the existence or the cause of a patient's injury, but a report is necessary when a treating physician's testimony "extends beyond the facts disclosed during care and treatment of the patient." 58 In While this requirement may lead to more certainty as to where to draw the line between those needing to produce expert reports and those that do not, patients may be prejudiced if a doctor who is not thought to initially need to produce an expert report later discovers he or she must testify as to causation. These necessary witnesses may be banned from testifying even when there would be no unfair prejudice to opposing sides.
b. Depends on the extent of the treating physician's testimony
Several courts have proposed that whether a treating physician is labeled as a fact witness or an expert depends upon the extent of his testimony.61 In these jurisdictions, the physician's fact testimony is "limited only to the physician's observations and actions in caring for the patient.'.6 2 Consequently, a Rule 26(a)(2)(A) disclosure would be necessary "even where the physician would be called upon to explain his or her diagnosis and prognosis for the patient.'.6 3 For example, in Downey v. Bob's Discount Furniture Holdings, Inc., the First Circuit concluded that because an alleged expert's "opinion testimony [arose] not from his enlistment as an expert but, rather, from his ground-level involvement in the events giving rise to the litigation," he fell "outside the compass ofRule 26(a)(2)(B).'..64
In Thomas v. Consolidated Rail Corporation, the court found that an expert report was required of a treating physician testifying beyond observations made during his treatment of a plaintiff because he testified "at least in part, not merely based on observations made during the course of treatment, but on professional expertise going beyond treatment per se.'.6 5 Accordingly, a treating physician who "formulated opinions going beyond what was necessary to provide appropriate care for the injured party steps 59. Brooks v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 620 F.3d 896, 900 (8th Cir. 2010).
60. Id at 900. 6 L Cohen & Jacxsens, supra note 32 (finding that ''to the extent that a treating physician testifies only to the care and treatment of a patient, the physician is not a 'specially employed' expert, and is not required to produce a written report prior to the admission of his or her testimony in an action by the patient"). [Vol. 9:1 into the shoes of a retained expert," thus requiring an expert report. 66 In Gonzalez v. Executive Airlines, Inc., the court concluded that a treating doctor was not required to produce an expert report when the physician testified only to the care and treatment of a patient. 67 Nevertheless, those opinions that treating physicians developed independently from their examination of the ·patient "constitute[ d] expert opinion testimony and [were] subject to the more stringent requirements of Rule 26(b )( 4 )(c). ,,6&
While this strategy does create a clear, bright-line standard, it also creates potential complications. It creates a report requirement for those treating physicians who testify as to causation or prognosis, even though these doctors may have opined as to causation or prognosis in their course of treatment of a patient. In addition, it may not easily be enforced, as it may be difficult to tell when a doctor goes beyond what was necessary to step into the shoes of a retained expert.
c. No need to produce an expert report when treating physician's testimony based upon personal knowledge
A number of courts conclude that a treating physician may testify as to causation and prognosis without producing an expert report, provided that his testimony is based on his or her personal knowledge or observations made during the course of care and treatment, and so long as the physician was not "specially retained in connection with the litigation or for trial.',6 9 However, when the doctor opines "beyond the facts disclosed during the care and treatment of the patient" and "is specifically retained to develop opinion testimony, he or she is subject to the report requirement." 70 In Salas v. United States, the court concluded that if the physician's opinions were acquired directly through his treatment of the plaintiff, then he was not required to submit a written report. 71 Accordingly, a treating physician's opinions on causation and permanency do not necessarily render him or her an expert needing to produce a report simply because he or she "consider[ed] not just the plaintiff's diagnosis and prognosis, but also the cause." 72 Instead, "[t]he relevant question is whether [the] treating physicians acquired their opinions as to the cause of the plaintiff's injuries directly through their treatment of the plaintiff." 73 In 26(a)(2)(B) written report requirement applies when a doctor's opinion testimony stretches "beyond the facts disclosed during care and treatment of the patient, and the doctor is specifically retained to develop opinion testimony."74 However, in so far as a "treating physician testifies only to the care and treatment of the patient," he or she is not deemed "a 'specially employed' expert and is not subject to the written report requirements of Rule 26(a) (2) In Hall v. Sykes, the court concluded that a treating physician who ''form[ ed] an opinion of the causation of an injury to a patient and the prognosis of the patient's condition during the treatment," was not required to submit a Rule 26(a)(2)(B) report. 79 Conversely, if that doctor, "even though he may be a treating physician," was "specially retained or employed to render a medical opinion based on factors that were not learned in the course of the treatment of the patient," then an expert report from that physician would be necessary. 80 Notably, however, just because a treating physician is paid a fee does not automatically establish that treating·physician as "a specially retained or employed expert" who must prepare an expert report. 81
In In Wreath v. United States, the court concluded that treating physicians who testified "only to the care and treatment afforded to a party" were intentionally excluded from the expert report requirement pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). 85 Those treating physicians who testify only ''to the care and treatment of his/her patient," are not considered specially retained experts even though they advance opinion testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 702, 703, or 705. 86 Conversely, a doctor whose "proposed opinion testimony extends beyond the facts made known to him during the course of the care and treatment of the patient," and who is "specially retained to develop specific opinion testimony," must produce a Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) expert report. 87 In Farris v. Intel Corp., the court found that the Rule 26(a)(2)(B) report requirement "does not apply to treating physician[s]," because they are "hybrid witness[es],'' who may ''testify to 'fact opinions,"' including "causation, diagnosis, prognosis, and the extent of Plaintiff's disability or injury derived from his observations and treatment.'.s 8 However, the extent of a treating physician's opinion testimony is limited, as he or she is "not permitted to provide expert testimony regarding any opinion he [or she] formed based on information learned outside of, and not related to, [the patient's] treatment" if they do not produce an expert report. 89 In Hawkins v. Grace/and, the Sixth Circuit held that the necessity of an expert report by a treating physician depended upon ''the substance of the treating physician's testimony rather than his or-her status" and to not classify a treating physician as an expert under Rule 26 "simply by virtue of his or her expertise. " 90 The physician is thus not categorized as an expert witness '"if he or she testifies about observations based on personal knowledge, including the treatment of the party. "' 91 Instead, a doctor is only considered an expert subject to the Rule 26 requirements when he standing ofhis decision making process in the situation''). opines "beyond the facts disclosed during care and treatment of the patient," and he or she "is specially retained to develop opinion testimony." 92 Similarly, in Mohney v. USA Hockey, Inc., the Sixth Circuit held that when a treating physician testifies as to his or her own personal knowledge, he or she may testifY without being designated an expert. 93 When the physician uses outside resources to inform him or herself, such as watching a videotape of the incident, 94 that doctor must be disclosed as an expert. 95 In Fielden v. CSX Transportation, Inc., the court did not select a particular method to determine the status of treating physicians, but the Sixth Circuit discussed the strategies utilized by other courts. 96 The court found that this case was not inconsistent with those jurisdictions that look to fundamental fairness of the circumstances because the scope of the testimony was of no surprise to the opposing party. 97 The court also concluded that this case was not "inconsistent with those that have focused on the content of the physician's testimony," because both parties were aware of the content of the physician's testimony. 98 The Sixth Circuit a4ditionally concluded that a physician relying only upon his ordinary medical training would not qualifY as an expert. 99 Finally, the court found that it was consistent with other courts who determine the status of experts by "whether a treating physician relies on tests, documents, books, videos, or other sources that the physician did not rely upon during his or her treatment of the patient" because there was "no evidence that [ [Vol. 9:1 patient's] injuries at the time of the treatment." 101 . This ·standard is more patient-friendly, as it allows more treating physicians to testify without the burden of an expert report. However, this standard may result in oversimplifications, for requiring a report from these doctors may result in unfair prejudice to patients because a true treating physician may consult outside information in Order to more adequately and. efficiently treat his or her patient. On the other hand, opposing parties could argue that unfair prejudice exists because these doctors are technically providing scientific knowledge described under F .R.E; 702 without producing an expert report. Interview questions posed to judges in the District of Massachusetts highlight how prickly this problem can be within the same district court. 108 For example, Judge Earns "do[es] not require expert reports from treating physicians, only the production of the relevant medical records." 109 Similarly, Judge Gorton does not require expert reports to be disclosed for physicians testifying as both treating physician and expert witness, and Judge Stearns does not require expert reports so long as it is "made clear by the offering party prior to any deposition that the treating physician will be asked to give expert opinions at trial." 110 On the other hand, Judges Neiman, Hillman, Gertner, Tauro, and O'Toole require reports to be disclosed for physicians testifying as both treating physician and expert witness.111 The judges also had varying answers when asked about whether they "strictly limit the scope of expert testimony at trial matters explicitly disclosed in expert reports," or ''where appropriate permit an expert to testifY on matters related to but not specifically described in the reports." 112 For instance, Judge Young assures experts ''very strictly'' stick to their expert reports. 113 On the other hand, Judge Gorton allows an expert to testify outside their reports where appropriate, and Judge Saris "do[ es] not limit the expert testimony to the report if there has been a deposition." 114 Ultimately, it is clear that no uniform standard exists amongst the courts of appeals, and there is even. division amongst the district courts within the courts of appeals and their district courts. However, it appears that over the last few years, courts have gravitated towards allowing a treating physician to testify without producing an expert report, even as to causation and prognosis, so long as his testimony is based upon the treating physician's course of treatment of the patient. 115 
D. Seventh Circuit's Management of Treating Physicians
This division and uncertainty also exists in the Seventh Circuit be- cause the court has yet to provide clear guidance on treating physicians, and district courts have thus been forced to elect their own strategies. The leading Seventh Circuit opinion decided after the 1993 Rule 26 amendment was Musser v. Gentiva Health Services. 116 In Musser v. Gentiva Health Services, the Seventh Circuit examined a medical malpractice claim in which a Northern District of Indiana judge had excluded the plaintiffs' treating physician because the plaintiffs had failed to disclose the treating physician as an expert. 117 The plaintiffs had disclosed the treating physicians as fact witnesses, and the defendant possessed their medical records and had the opportunity to depose the doctors, but the Seventh Circuit determined that this was not sufficient to allow the treating physicians to testify. 118 Instead, the court concluded that a treating physician should be disclosed as an expert when his or her testimony "consists of opinions based on 'scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge' regardless of whether those opinions were formed during the scope of interaction with a party prior to litigation." 119 The court nonetheless found that a report is not always required of a treating physician, yet did not provide any further direction on the matter. 120 The Seventh Circuit simply stated that "some district courts have suggested that if the Rule 26(a)(2)(A) testimony exceeds the scope of treatment and ventures into more general expert opinion testimony, a report may be necessary." 121 Subsequently, in Blameuser v. Hasenfang, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that it has "never held that treating physicians must file expert reports."122 The court ultimately held that no expert report was required of a treating physician who based his testimony primarily on the medical chart he prepared and his treatment and diagnosis, which he reached during his treatment. 123 However, the Seventh Circuit failed to offer any further suggestions on treating physicians. 124 Judge Easterbrook noted that "[a ]n interesting question is what to do with a treating physician who proposes to testify in the manner of a hired expert, i.e., offering an opinion regarding what might have happened to the patient that does not rely on that physician's personal treatment of the patient." 125 In Additionally, in Banister v. Burton, the Seventh Circuit found that no report was required because the doctor at issue was the treating physician, and he was not retained. 129 The court concluded that Meyers was distinguishable from Banister because Meyers concerned a physician's opinion "as to the cause of an injury determined for the purpose of litigation," which differs from a judgment "as to the effects of the injury at the time of treatment." 130 Moreover, the physician at issue "did not formulate his opinion at the request of the [party] as the doctors in Meyers had."m He had instead given "the same testimony at the state criminal trial .and when he was deposed by the parties." 132 Thus, the Seventh Circuit has left open whether a treating physician is in fact a witness or an expert because it never affirmatively or absolutely held that treating physicians were experts. 133 Furthermore, the court failed to definitively answer whether a report should be required of a treating physician who formed his opinion within the course of treatment of the patient.134 Due to the lack of direction from the Seventh Circuit, there remains 
Being Retained Creates a Report Requirement
Some district courts in the Seventh Circuit have held that whether a report is required depends on whether a treating physician was retained. For instance, in Osuji v. City of Chicago, the court held that "[b]ecause the doctors were not retained or specially employed, plaintiff need not have submitted a report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B)." 136 In addition, in Logan v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., the court based its decision to require an expert report partly upon the appearance that the treating physician had been retained.137
Causation Creates a Report Requirement
Several judges have held that a treating physician must provide a report when he or she provides testimony beyond his or her observations, diagnosis, or treatment and is expected to include opinions on issues such as causation, prognosis, and permanency. 138 For example, in Tzoumis v. ) (concluding that the testimony from the patient's treating physicians that "might offer outside the scope of their treatment of plaintiff must be barred" because it was likely that the doctors "would be asked to testify as experts about the standard of care for a torn rotator cuff and how plaintiff's treatment in prison related to that care;" yet, allowing the treating physicians to testify so long as they did not "present testimony outside the scope of his treatment of plaintiff''). 
Tempel Steel Co., a Northern District of Illinois judge held that "[a]
treating physician is not automatically an 'expert' witness simply because he is a doctor." Even when he is not disclosed as an expert, a treating physician "may still testify regarding his observations made during the course of treatment and on matters in his personal knowledge." 139 However, once a physician's testimony "goes beyond his personal observations, treatment, and diagnosis," it "slips over into matters normally considered 'expert' testimony," and hence "may be barred." 140
In Griffith v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter R.R., a Northern
District of Illinois judge held that a treating physician was not required to produce a written report under Fed R. Civ. P. 26 when the physician limited his testimony to matters dealing with the care and treatment of a patient.141 However, when the treating physician opines as to causation, prognosis, or future disability, "[h]e is going beyond his personal involvement in the facts of the case and giving an opinion formed because there is a lawsuit" and therefore must comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(a)(2)(B). 142
In Bell v. Columbia St. Mary's Hosp. Milwaukee, Inc., the plaintiff argued that the treating physician's treatment records should suffice instead of a report because ''the defendants [could] effectively prepare for cross examination through reviewing the treating physicians' treatment records and deposing the doctors.'' 143 However, since the treating physicians were to be "called upon to offer expert testimony regarding their opinions drawn from their treatment of [the patient], the prognosis of Bell's injury, and potentially to offer testimony regarding the causation of [the plaintiff's] injury and future disability," an Eastern District ofWisconsinjudge required these treating physicians to provide Rule 26(a)(2)(B) reports. 144 Furthermore, a few Northern District of Indiana judges have held that treating physicians must be designated as experts, and whether a treating physician needs to produce an expert report depends on the extent of his testimony: if a physician testifies' beyond his scope of treatment to causation, prognosis, or permanency, he or she will be required to produce an expert report. 1996) (holding that a.treating physician could not testify regarding causation because he was not disclosed as an expert pursuant to Rule 26(aX2), and the doctor was "purporting to speak as an expert on these issues based on some unspecified body of professional knowledge" 
Disclosure Depends on How the Information Was Obtained
It seems that the majority of district courts within the Seventh Circuit are moving towards a standard that allows treating physicians to offer opinion testimony on causation, diagnosis, and prognosis of their patients without providing an expert report so long as their testimony is based upon their personal knowledge of the facts surrounding the injuries and treatment of the patient. 147 For instance, in McCloughan v. City of Springfield, the court found that, plaintiff's treating physicians, who had not filed Rule 26 expertwitness disclosure reports, could offer opinions on causation, diagnosis and prognosis. 148 Generally, no expert report was required of a treating physician provided that his or her "planned testimony was acquired, not in preparation for trial, but rather because he was an actor or viewer with respect to transactions or occurrences that are a part of the subject matter of the law- suit.u 149 The court concluded that "instead of focusing on whether a witness is an 'expert' under the Federal Ru1es of Evidence, the question, in reality, is: whether the witness whose opinion is sought to be elicited is someone from whom a report is required under Fed. R. Civ. P. ('Rule') 26(a)(2)(B),'' or in other words, whether the witness "is retained or specifically employed to provide expert testimony in the case." 150 As a resu1t, a treating physician "may offer opinion testimony on causation, diagnosis, and prognosis without the prerequisite of providing a Ru1e 26(a)(2)(B) report." 151 In Gary v. Alexander, the court considered whether reports were required of the plaintiff's treating physicians. 152 Even though the court recognized that "a party must still disclose the treating physician as an expert witness under Rule 26(a)(2)(A)," it held that "Ru1e 26(a)(2)(B) does not apply to treating physicians who provide opinion testimony formulated in connection with treatment, including opinions on causation, diagnosis, and prognosis. 153 Similarly, in Osterhouse v. Grover, the court considered whether plaintiffs' treating physicians shou1d be excluded from testifying because they did not produce expert reports. 154 The court concluded that the plaintiffs' treating physicians were not retained because they were testifying "based on the medical records, testing, [or] examinations that were performed during the treatment of a plaintiff and not necessarily in anticipation of litigation." 155 Further, there was no indication that the plaintiffs had "solicited the services of any of the doctors s<>lely because they intended to file suit." 156 Moreover, testimony as to causation or prognoses generally failed to "elevate these doctors" to the status of a retained expert because it is not uncommon for a doctor to obtain information and to develop opinions regarding the "processes of an injury" as well as '"the future ramifications of an injury" during his or her course of treatment of a patient. 157 Occasionally, some Southern District of Indiana judges have allowed treating physicians who were designated as experts to testifY regarding causation, permanency, and prognosis without producing expert reports. 158 Moreover, they have permitted treating physicians to opine as to causation, diagnosis, and prognosis without providing a Ru1e 26 report. 159 For instance, in Martin v. CSX Transportation, Inc., Magistrate Judge Baker wrote that "[i]t is within the normal range of duties for a health care provider to develop opinions regarding causation and prognosis during the ordinary course of an examination," as ''to properly treat and diagnose a patient, the doctor needs to understand the cause of a patient's injuries." 160 As a result, a physician "whose proposed opinion testimony will come from his knowledge acquired as a treating physician, is not someone from whom a Rule 26(a)(2)(B) report is required." 161 Similarly, in McQuiston v. Helms, the court concluded that a physician "'whose proposed opinion testimony will come from his knowledge acquired as a treating physician, is not someone from whom a Ru1e 26(a)(2)(B) report is required."' 162 Because the physician witness in McQuiston did not rely upon information gathered ex parte from the expert's treatment of the patient, no expert report was required. 163 Without clear or conclusive guidance from the Seventh Circuit, the district courts have employed varying strategies to· determine whether treating physicians must produce expert reports. Moreover, this lack of guidance has caused many judges within the same district courts to differ in managing the report requirement for treating physicians. However, recently courts appear to be gravitating toward a standard that requires no expert report unless the doctor has testified outside his or her· course of treatment of the plaintiff. 
E. Lingering Problems
Because of the lack of clear standards, problems have lingered and are likely to continue, notwithstanding the 2010 Rule 26 amendments. 164 Even where courts have annunciated their own uniform standards, it remains difficult to determine whether a report is required because "[t]he dividing line may be between knowledge that [a] doctor has solely as a result of treating the patient, and analyses or insights the doctor develops at the behest of the patient's lawyer." 165 Moreover, physician witnesses are often difficult to compartmentalize as lay witnesses or expert witnesses because they often toe the line between retained experts and treating physician witnesses. 166 Additionally, preparing an expert witness report in accordance with Rule 26(b)(2)(B) is time consuming even though counsel is allowed to assist the expert witness because the Rule requires that a doctor be "extremely thorough."t67
Many attorneys throughout the country are still struggling with these standards. 168 Questions have been left open in the Seventh Circuit, including determining how far a treating physician may testify without producing an expert report. 169 For example, could a treating physician "offer any opinions that are based solely on 'the facts made known to him [or her] during the course of the care and treatment,' even if the opinions are not essential to care and treatment . . . as long as the physician has not been 'specially retained' to develop that opinion?" 170 In addition, what does "specially retained ... to provide expert testimony'' mean?m For example, if a patient's back was healthy before an accident but is fractured after the accident, and a doctor diagnoses the fracture and that he knows of no other medical causes that may be relevant to the treatment, would this be an opinion that transforms the doctor into an expert? 172 Moreover, if a d,octor diag- noses lung cancer in a nonsmoker, does the diagnosis qualify as an expert opinion if the doctor concludes that it was caused by workplace exposure?173 This struggle to understand the implications of Rule 26 has also encouraged the tactical gamesmanship that is utilized by attorneys in an effort to avoid placing the label of expert on their treating physicians. 174 Examples of tactics utilized by attorneys include-"retaining two experts (one to testify and one as a consultant to do the work and develop the opinion), imposing contrived record-keeping practices, and wasting valuable deposition time exploring every communication between a lawyer and expert and every change to an expert report." 175 As a result, the amendments have had "a chilling effect_ on counsel's interactions with testifying experts," and attorneys have employed ''various costly and counterproductive strategies to avoid making disclosures under the Rule." 176 This issue thus raises practical questions of how to avoid causing prejudice to both plaintiffs and defendants. For instance, if treating physicians are labeled fact witnesses or expert witnesses who do not need to produce expert reports, defendants may be prejudiced as a result because plaintiffs could purposefully circumvent full disclosure or use this quasi-loophole as an excuse to add an expert physician at the eleventh hour before a discovery deadline. 177 The lack of a report requirement may even be exploited to sneak in an expert physician after a dead1ine. 178 Alternatively, labeling a treating physician as an expert required to produce a report may prejudice plaintiffs whose treating physicians lack the time to complete an extensive expert report. 179 Moreover, treating physicians themselves may be reluctant to be des-173. This example was conceptualized through discussions with Indianapolis-area attorneys. 174. Joseph, supra note 30, at 372 (noting that the distinction between a true treating physician and the hired gun is "subject to manipulation (since a patient can always start treating with a new, lawyer-suggested doctor)j. was not actually a treating physician but was solely retained in anticipation, causing the "treatment" to be a fa9ade ).
178. See, e.g., id. (where defendants claimed that patient's reputed treating physician was not actually a treating physician but was solely retained in anticipation, and therefore the "treatment'' was a fa~e). 179. Cohen & Jacxsens, supra note 32 ("This will aid defense counsel both in developing strategy regarding their Rule 26 disclosures of treating physicians and in capitalizing on the opposing side's errors regarding disclosures of treating physicians.").
ignated experts, and it is commonly difficult for attorneys to convince treating doctors to take the time to prepare for trial and to produce a detailed report before the treating physicians are even asked to testify. 180 The report requirement may also negatively affect the health of patients because it takes time away from treatment and patient care. 181 These resulting difficulties may affect the ability of patients to bring claims or defenses. 182 Furthermore, the whole purpose behind Rule 26 seems to be defeated if true treating physicians are required to produce experts report because they were not retained in anticipation of litigation, when the 1993 Rule 26 Advisory Committee appeared to purposely exclude expert physicians from this extra burden. 183 Finally, it is highly problematic that whether an expert report is required is dependent upon the district court in which the case was filed or the judge to whom it was assigned. 184 Thus, courts may be encouraging forum or judge shopping, and, as such, justice may not be meted out equally amongst patients if a court later decides to prevent a treating physician from testifying due to the lack of an expert report.
Ill. CHANGES TO RULE 26(A) AND ITS POTENTIAL RAMIFICATIONS
The proposed amendments to Rule 26( a) that took effect in December 2010 may change the way courts view treating physicians. As a new addition to this section, Rule 26(a)(2)(C) provides that even an expert who is not required to produce an expert report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) must still provide "a summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to testify." 185 Hence, regardless of whether a treating physician needs to produce an expert report, there must be some cursory information provided by treating physicians to opposing parties.
This new obligation is "similar in substance to the pre-1993 version of Rule 26(b)(4)(A)," allowing for expert discovery through interrogatories! 86 However, the new obligation does not force a complete expert report from any expert witness who was previously exempted under the 1993 version of Rule 26(a)(2) (B) . 187 This added requirement may help "resolve[] a tension that has sometimes prompted courts to require reports under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) even from witnesses exempted from the report requirement," and a full report would still only be necessary from an expert described under Rule 26(a)(2)(B). 188 The 2010 Advisory Committee Note concluded that this report is less burdensome than the export report requirement. 189 However, the Committee cautioned courts to guard against making this requirement too onerous, urging them to ••take care against requiring undue detail," and " [to] keep[] in mind that these witnesses have not been specially retained and may not be as responsive to counsel as those who have." 190 Therefore, as long as these witnesses are identified under Rule 26(a)(2)(A) and provide the necessary disclosure under Rule 26(a)(2)(C), the witnesses may enjoy their hybrid status as a fact witness and an expert witness without being required to produce a Rule 26(a)(2)(B) report. 191 Accordingly, this new rule establishes a compromise, requiring a less burdensome expert report to be produced by a patient's treating physician, while concurrently giving the opposing party sufficient notice as to the content of the doctor's testimony. 192 Some further mitigation for patients exists because a treating physician who testifies as both as an expert witness and a fact witness is not required to disclose the facts to which he or she is testifying as a fact witness. 193 In other words, the "disclosure obligation does not include facts unrelated to the expert opinions the witness will present." 194 Potential prejudices exist for both parties due to these 2010 Rule 26 amendments. 195 There is now a written summary requirement for doctors who become ensnared in time-consuming litigation purely because of their profession, which requires treatment of patients. This added obligation may make doctors even more reluctant to testify. 196 In addition, patients must disclose the extent of the physician's expert testimony in this summary statement, and this physician will likely be restricted to testifying to only the information included in this statement. 197 Consequently, patients suffer· ing from new symptoms or receiving new diagnoses subsequent to the dis .. closure of the summary report may be prejudiced. Moreover, this process may be difficult for physicians because they will likely be asked to verify disclosures drafted by attorneys, whereas the physicians had previously drafted their own disclosures or verified their own records. 198 There will also be an added expense for whoever formulates this summary report, thereby adding to the potential costs of litigation. 199 The summary report requirement may also be more burdensome, particularly in cases where there are several treating physicians.l 00 However, the Rule 26 amendments simultaneously "may save both time and money associated with retaining experts and discovering their opinions." 201 Because these requirements are less burdensome than the cur .. rent rule and may be drafted by attorneys, the time and money required· to allow a patient's treating physician to testify will be significantly less. 202 Further, as opposing parties will have access to the extent of a treating phy .. sician's testimony, less unfair surprises will occur, and "[s]uch summary reports may even eliminate the need for depositions.'.20 3 Party opponents stand to gain much information from this summary statement that they did not receive in the past when a party was determined to avoid producing an expert report. 204 Defendants will now be able to ob .. tain a general idea of the extent of a treating physician • s expert testimony, but courts may be more reluctant to designate treating physicians as experts needing to produce a full .. blown expert report. In these cases, defendants in INDIANA HEALTH LAW REVJEW [Vol. 9:1 some jurisdictions may actually have even less access to information. 205 Yet, because the new Rule 26(a)(2)(C) "draws no distinction between parties, in theory, defendants will have the same ability as plaintiffs to designate and describe the opinion testimony of plaintiffs' treating physicians. " 206 However, questions regarding this process still remain, and much will be left to the discretion of courts. 207 For instance, it will likely be difficult to separate 'unrelated' facts from related facts which "could prompt the opponent to challenge, through motion practice, the sufficiency of presenting side's summary disclosures.'o208
Overall, it seems that while this new requirement may obviate some of the confusion that was created by the Rule 26 (a)(2)(B), the summary report requirement has potentially created new prejudices by different means. Ultimately, it appears that courts will again have to decipher an unclear standard in Rule 26(a)(2)(C) and create their own schematics. Similar to the splits of opinion that occurred after the adoption of Rule 26(a)(2)(B), divisions amongst courts and the use of various strategies will likely occur as a result of the new summary report requirement. Thus, by attempting to take steps forward through the addition of Rule 26(a)(2)(C), courts may actually be taking a step back by not drawing clearer standards.
IV. SUGGESTED FRAMEWORK

A. Taking into Account the Purposes of Treating Physicians' Testimony
Because there have been conflicting opinions on the need to produce an expert report, now is the time to set the record straight on Rule 26(a)(2)(B). When considering which system to adopt, the Seventh Circuit should consider the pw.poses of the testimony of treating physicians: they "are not retained for purposes of trial," and thus "(t]heir testimony is based upon their personal knowledge of the treatment of the patient and not information acquired from outside sources for the purpose of giving an opinion in anticipation oftrial.'.209 Treating physicians are not chosen as experts by their patients, but instead "are witnesses testifying to the facts of their examination, diagnosis, and treatment of the patient " 210 In conducting his or her duties as a doctor, a treating physician will establish an opinion based on his or her examination of the patient and will often opine as to the patient's future prognosis. 211 "These opinions are a necessary part of the treatment of the patient.'.zt 2 Thus, "[a ]fter all is said and done, most treating physicians are not retained by parties as expert witnesses," and just because treating physicians may be considered experts due to their scientific knowledge "does not change this reality.'.2 13 There is a difference between those experts who are retained in anticipation of litigation and treating physicians, which may justify treating the two differently. "Retained experts are tantamount to employees of the retaining party, whereas "[m]ost treating physicians ... are related to the party only by virtue of the historical accident of having treated the party's injuries.'.2 14 In addition, a treating physician's testimony is "often more relevant, material, and probative, than that of the retained expert who is not only paid for his testimony but often gleans it from a cold record.'.2ts
Moreover, while there are potential prejudices for a party who is unaware of the extent of an expert's testimony, this is not often the case with a treating physician, and there are ways that patients can avoid causing any prejudice to opposing parties. ''The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure approved by Congress do supply other mechanisms, besides formal reports, for extracting the views of an expert witness,'' and thus "sandbagging is not necessarily inevitable.'' 216 These mechanisms include a party's Rule 26(a)(l)(A) disclosures ofwitnesses, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(l)(B)'s requirement of producing "all documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things that are in possession, custody, or control of the party and that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses, unless solely for impeachment," depositions, individual document demands, and other discovery the court deems necessary and appropriate. 217 Even if these protections are not enough, a party may be sanctioned under Rule 3 7 for failure to comply with any of the above, and "district courts are empowered to go 
B. Balancing Test Proposition
The Seventh Circuit should enunciate a standard that would include balancing a number of factors against the interests ofboth parties. None of these factors are alone sufficient, and they all should be considered when deciding what type of witness the treating physician will be.
Treating physicians should not always have to be designated experts. There are situations in which treating physicians should remain fact witnesses. When a treating physician's testimony is limited to uncontroversial issues such as a patient's injuries, and both parties will not experience any surprises or prejudice as a result of his or her testimony, then the doctor should be considered a lay witness. For instance, there are times when a treating physician may have learned the underlying facts from personal observation or experience, 219 or everything is available in the "cold record," and a treating physician is simply testifying as to the records that have already been produced to the other side. Situations such as these suggest that a treating physician should not suffer the burden of a summary report for such limited testimony.
• Courts should consider a number of factors to determine whether a treating physician is an expert who needs to produce a report versus a summary report. These should include:
• Did the physician ask to review medical records of another health care provider in order to develop his opinion testimony concerning the appropriateness of the care and treatment of the provider? 220 Similarly, did the treating physician rely upon records, which were produced by his or her counsel or from any other person in order to establish his opinion? 221 • Did the treating physician provide a great deal of analysis exclusively for trial, and was he compensated for this work? 222 • Did the client's attorney refer the patient to the physician for treatment?
• How was the physician compensated? Was his or her compensation determined by their time spent preparing to testify or testifying at trial? 223 • How long has the physician treated the patient?
• What is expected to be the depth of the physician's testimony?
• Was the injury considered by the treating physician known to the patient before the commencement oflitigation?
• Was the opposing party aware of the extent and scope of the treating physician's treatment?
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The Seventh Circuit should generally adhere to the approach that seems to have been embraced by a growing number of courts, including numerous district courts located within the Seventh Circuit. The primary consideration of a court should be whether the proposed testimony was part of the treating physician's personal knowledge of the facts. Then, the rest of the above factors should be considered on the balance of the circumstances to determine whether a full-blown expert report is necessary.
Suppose that an accident occurred where a plaintiff was injured and now sued the defendant for his injuries. If the treating physician were only to testifY based upon his medical records and opinions, then courts should allow that treating physician to testifY as to causation, prognosis, or permanency of injury or disability without producing an expert report. However, if a treating physician bases his testimony upon outside information provided by others, courts could reasonably categorize the physician. as an expert witness. Accordingly, the treating physician would be required to complete an expert report. By looking to the length of treatment, the date when treatment began, the date the lawsuit was filed, and the date when the pa ... tient became aware of his condition, courts may get a sense of whether this doctor was retained solely for the purposes of litigation. Also, a patient that was referred to a physician by his attorney should also cause courts to raise an eyebrow because it is much more likely that doctor was retained as an expert witness for the purposes of the trial.
A court should also inquire into the opposing party's knowledge of the treating physician before determining an expert report is required. Accordingly, if an opposing party is fully aware of the extent of a treating physician's testimony, there is less of a need for the production of an expert report. [Vol. 9:1 26{a)(2)(C). 224 A mandate requiring summary reports from all treating physicians is especially concerning, considering that the guidelines for completing a report are inadequate, thus forcing the parties to guess at what the court will consider acceptable. One judge in the Southern District of Indiana has suggested that these analyses will be on a ''witness-by-witness basis,"225 but other district courts in the Seventh Circuit have thus far not provided significant assessments on the substance of the summary reports by treating physicians.
C. When Treating Physicians
The Seventh Circuit district courts should be mindful in crafting their own strategies under amended Rule 26 that while the new summary requirement eases the burden on those physicians who had previously been automatically required to complete an expert report, other treating physicians who were not in districts that required reports are experiencing a new burden. Hence, when determining what is required in this summary report, courts should err on the side of caution in favor of patients. Treating physicians are often vitally important to a patient's case and likely form the backbone of the evidence, and hence courts should be more lenient, particularly when opposing parties are aware of the extent of a treating physician's opinions and testimony.
Moreover, it is more reasonable to allow patients to submit a broader summary report as opposed to a specific report that may subsequently limit the extent of that physician's testimony. 226 Opposing parties will have ac-cess to the doctor's medical records, will be able to depose the treating physician, and thus will possess more than adequate notice of a treating physician's testimony. Consequently, opposing parties are unlikely to face unfair prejudice in the wake of a broader type of report so long as they have fair notice of a doctor's opinion testimony and time to prepare for it.
By employing a more liberal standard for the summary report requirement, the Seventh Circuit can even the playing field between patients and opposing parties. Treating physicians will be less burdened and less constricted, and opposing parties will still have sufficient notice which will help them avoid unfair prejudice.
V. CONCLUSION The need for a clear standard has been apparent since the 1993 Rule 26 amendments, and with the addition of Rule 26(b)(2)(C), the time is ripe to determine where treating physicians fall within the new schematic. Above all, the Seventh Circuit lacks uniformity in the way it determines the necessity of an expert designation, an expert report requirement, and a summary report requirement. Currently, where a treating physician belongs in Rule 26 may depend on the district or even the individual judge assigned to the case.
When considering whether to impose an expert report requirement, the foremost consideration of Seventh Circuit courts should be whether the doctor consulted records outside his or her scope of treatment in developing his or her testimony. The usual mark of a retained expert involves his or her use of other physicians' records or other outside information to develop his opinion. This standard is easier to interpret than the strategies of other courts. In addition, it will not be hard to utilize in Seventh Circuit courts because several courts have already implemented this standard. By additionally instituting the proposed balancing test, courts will be able to avoid requiring an expert report of those true treating physicians who consulted outside resources simply as a part of their treatment of the patient.
Determining the extent of the new summary report requirement will not be a simple process, but the Seventh Circuit should consider the burden that it imposes upon treating physicians and should adopt a broader approach to these reports unless unfair prejudice or surprise is likely to occur to an opposing party. If the history of the expert report requirement has taught us anything, it is the need for uniformity, and the Seventh Circuit should therefore adopt a single, clear standard, which leaves little room for manipulation by parties seeking to pass through quasi-loopholes.
The issue of treating physicians has been lingering long enough, and plaintiff. Such testimony was subject to the disclosure requirements of Rule 26(aX2)(C), and having failed to provide defendant with a summary of those opinions and the facts supporting those opinions, defendant would be unduly prejudiced to allow such testimony at trial or in any other proceeding.").
